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The key theme underpinning this report is that the dependence of the Australian economy on 
the mining and minerals industries and on low cost energy has been the critical influence on 
the Australian approach to climate change policy.  The Commonwealth government has 
emphasised the importance of no regrets approaches and has relied heavily on voluntary 
approaches – in particular, its Greenhouse Challenge programme – as a central element of 
policy directed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from Australian business.  This report 
analyses the Greenhouse Challenge in the context of Australia’s overall climate change 
policies and assesses the potential contribution of such programmes to delivering on the 
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that are likely to be required to stabilise 
atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions in the range 450-500 ppm
1. 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
Australia is one of the most arid continents in the world.  The fragility of its diverse 
ecosystems and tendency to extremes of drought and flooding render it vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change.  Australia is also exposed to risks such as disruptions to water 
supply, increases in the severity of storms, floods and droughts, coastal erosion due to sea 
level rise, and negative human health impacts (e.g. through an increase in the range and 
spread of tropical diseases and pests)
2.   
 
Australia’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004 was A$821 billion (around US$616 
billion), equating to a GDP per capita of A$40,604
3.  Services accounted for approximately 
74% (just under A$597 billion including electricity, gas and water supply) of GDP in 2003-
2004, with manufacturing accounting for 11% (A$83 billion), mining 4% (A$30 billion) and 
agriculture, forestry and fishing 3% (nearly A$24 billion)
4. 
 
Australia’s exports are heavily dependent on the mining and minerals industry, and on 
agriculture.  Australia is the world’s largest exporter of black coal, with over 218 million 
tonnes exported in 2003-2004, and is among the world’s leading exporters of bauxite, 
alumina, lead, uranium, gold, iron ore, aluminium, nickel and zinc.  Agriculture accounts for 
around 23% of total Australian merchandise exports, with exports worth $26.8 billion in 
2004
5.  Australia is the world’s largest exporter of wool and beef, the second largest exporter 
                                                           
1 Depending on the level of emissions reductions (or emissions growth) in less developed countries, this would 
equate to emissions reductions of the order of 60-90% in industrialised countries by 2050. 
2 For a more detailed descriptions of Australia’s exposure to climate change risk, see Australian Greenhouse 
Office (AGO) (2005a), Australia’s Fourth National Communication under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (AGO, Canberra) at 83-89; Allen Consulting Group (2005), Climate Change 
Risk and Vulnerability: Promoting an Efficient Adaptation Response in Australia (AGO, Canberra); CSIRO 
(2002), Living  with Climate Change (AGO, Canberra).  For an assessment of the investment implications of 
climate change, see Rolph, B. & Prior, E. (2006), Climate Change and the ASX100: An Assessment of Risks and 
Opportunities (Citigroup Equity Research, Australia/NZ, Sydney).  
3 AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 14. 
4 AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 19-22. 
5 AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 2, 21.   2
of cotton, sheep meats and wheat, the third largest exporter of canola and barley, and a 
significant exporter of wine. 
 
Electricity generation in Australia is dominated by coal-fired generation. In 2003-2004, 77% 
of electricity was sourced from black and brown coal and their by-products, while renewable 
energy sources, such as hydroelectricity, wind, solar, sugar cane residue (bagasse), wood and 
biogas accounted for 8%, natural gas 14% and petroleum products less than 1%
6.  Australia 
has no nuclear energy and limited hydro-electricity capacity.  
 
Australia is continuing to experience strong economic growth driven by demand for its 
agricultural and mineral commodities.  This growth, when taken together with the expected 
36.8% increase in Australia’s population over the period 1990-2021 and Australia’s reliance 
on long-haul transport across vast distances, is likely to continue to exert pressure on 
resources and energy use well into the twenty-first century. 
 
 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions profile is heavily influenced by its large energy-
intensive industries such as aluminium, iron and steel production, its large agriculture sector 
and its heavy dependence on long-haul transport. 
 
In 2004, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions totalled 564.7 million tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (MT CO2(eq)), an increase of 2.3 per cent over the 1990 levels of 551.9 MT 
CO2(eq)
7.  From 2003 to 2004, emissions increased by 13.9 MT CO2(eq), or 2.5 per cent.  
Table 1 breaks these emissions down by sector, and Figure 1 provides an overview of trends 
in sectoral emissions over the period 1990-2004. 
 










Energy   287.5   387.2   99.7  34.7% 
   Stationary Energy   195.7   279.9   84.2   43.0% 
Transport   61.7   76.2   14.5   23.4% 
Fugitive Emissions   30.0   31.0   1.0   3.4% 
Industrial Processes   25.3   29.8   4.5   18.0% 
Solvent and Other Product Use
9  NA   NA   NA   NA 
Agriculture   91.1   93.1   2.0   2.2% 
Land Use, Land Use Change & 
Forestry  
128.9   35.5   -93.4   -72.5% 
Waste   19.2   19.1   -0.1   -0.7% 
Net Emissions   551.9   564.7   12.8   2.3% 
 
 
                                                           
6 AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 16 
7 AGO (2006a), National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 2004 (AGO, Canberra). 
8 AGO (2006b), Analysis of Recent Trends and Greenhouse Indicators 1990-2004 (AGO, Canberra) at 7. 
9 Emissions from this sector are NMVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds), which cannot be 
converted into MT CO2(eq).   3




The reductions in the emissions from the land use, land use change and forestry category 
reflect the significant reductions in the rate at which Australian forests have been converted to 
agricultural or other land uses
11.  It should be noted that the credit for carbon sequestered in 
reforestation activities (i.e. plantations) established since 1990 will only be incorporated into 
national inventories for the period 2008-2012 (i.e. the Kyoto compliance period).  If these 
emissions are excluded from the inventory, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions would have 
increased by 25.1 per cent (from 423.0 to 529.2 MT CO2(eq)) over the period 1990-2004.  
 
Australia has three ‘macro indicators’ for assessing the effectiveness of climate change policy, 
namely: total net national emissions (discussed above), emissions per capita, and emissions 
per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Over the period 1990-2004, Australia’s 
population increased at an average of 1.2% per annum and economic activity at an average 
rate of 3.3% per annum
12.  The net effect is that emissions per capita declined at an average 
rate of 1.0% per annum, with emissions per dollar of GDP declining by 35% over this period.   
 
                                                           
10 AGO (2006b) (Note 8) at 7. 
11 Australia has reduced annual carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation from 129 million tonnes in 1990 to 
54 million tonnes in 2005, and this is expected to decrease to 45 million tonnes by 2010.  In addition, new forest 
land planted since 1990 is expected to remove (sequester) 21 million tonnes of carbon dioxide per year (AGO 
(2007), ‘Australia’s Forest Estate – Achievements’ (AGO, Canberra).  For more information on Australia’s 
approach to forest management, see www.greenhouse.gov.au/ncas   It is pertinent to note that there are 
significant uncertainities in the contributions of carbon sequestration to Australia’s total greenhouse gas 
emissions.  See, for example, Macintosh, A. (2007), ‘The National Greenhouse Accounts and Land Clearing: Do 
the Numbers Stack Up? Research Paper No. 38’ (The Australia Institute, Canberra); Macintosh, A. (2007), 
‘Response to the Federal Government’s Critique of The National Greenhouse Accounts and Land Clearing: Do 
the Numbers Stack Up?’ (The Australia Institute, Canberra). 
12 AGO (2006b) (Note 8) at 9-10.   4
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions are projected to reach 603 MT CO2(eq) in the period 
2008-2012 which, at 109% of 1990 levels
13, is slightly above Australia’s 108% Kyoto 
Protocol target.  These projections incorporate the contribution of the various greenhouse gas 
emission reduction measures that have been adopted by the Commonwealth, State, Territory 
and local governments.  The combined effect of these efforts is expected to cut annual 
emissions by 87 MT CO2(eq) by 2010
14.  In the absence of these measures, Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions were expected to reach 125% of the 1990 level by 2010
15.   
Greenhouse gas emissions per dollar of real Gross Domestic Product are projected to decline 
by 45% from 1990 to 2010 and emissions per capita are projected to decline by 12% over the 
same period (from 33 tonnes per capita to 29 tonnes per capita)
16.  
 
Emissions for 2020 are projected to reach 718 MT CO2(eq) or 127% of the 1990 level, 
reflecting the impact of ongoing growth in emissions in the energy sector (see Table 2).  Over 
the period to 2020, emissions per real dollar of GDP are expected to decline to 52% below the 
1990 level and the emissions per capita are expected to be 6% lower than in 1990 (31 tonnes 
as opposed to 31 tonnes per capita in 1990)
17. 
 
Table 2: Projected Changes in Sectoral Emissions (1990-2020)
18 
 
Projected increase (decrease) in 
emissions 1990-2010 
Projected increase (decrease) in 
emissions 1990-2020 
Sector 
% MT  CO2(eq) %  MT  CO2(eq) 
Stationary  Energy  56 110  84 165 
Transport    40 25 62 38 
Fugitive  Emissions  27 8  84 25 
Industrial  Processes  50 13 97 25 
Agriculture 5  4  11  10 
Waste  (19) (4)  (45) (8) 
Land  Use  Change  (65) (84) (65) (84) 
Forestry   (21)   (20) 
 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY RESPONSES 
 
Australian industry has consistently argued that the Australian government should only pursue 
policies that are flexible and cost-effective in their own right, and that have the least negative 
impact on competitiveness, investment, regional development and jobs
19.  This lobbying
20, 
                                                           
13 AGO (2006c), Tracking to the Kyoto Target: Australia’s Greenhouse Emissions Trends 1990 to 2008-2012 
and 2020 (AGO, Canberra) at 1. 
14 AGO (2006c) (Note 13) at 1. 
15 AGO (2006c) (Note 13) at 1. 
16 AGO (2006c) (Note 13) at 15. 
17 AGO (2006c) (Note 13) at 15. 
18 AGO (2006c) (Note 13) at 16, 18. 
19 See, for example, Knapp, R. (2004), ‘Australian Aluminium Council [AAC] Submission to the Senate ECITA 
Committee Inquiry into the Kyoto Protocol Ratification Bill 2003 [No. 2].  30 January 2004’ (AAC, Canberra); 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association (PACIA) (2004), ‘Submission to Senate Standing Committee on 
Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts in Relation to its Inquiry into the Kyoto 
Protocol Ratification Bill 2003 (No 2). January 2004’ (PACIA, Melbourne).  It is important to note that industry 
views are not homogenous with the CEOs of a number of major Australian businesses – BP Australasia, 
Insurance Australia, Origin Energy, Swiss Re, Visy Industries, Westpac – calling for early action on climate 
change (Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change (2006), ‘Joint CEO Statement’.   
http://www.businessroundtable.com.au/html//jointceo.html).    5
allied to the heavy dependence of the Australian economy on the mining and minerals 
industries, has strongly influenced the Australian government’s approach to both international 
negotiations and domestic policy.   
 
Despite being one of the few countries permitted to increase its greenhouse gas emissions 
under the Kyoto Protocol
21, the Australian government has decided not to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, arguing that the Protocol does not provide a clear pathway for emission reduction 
actions by developing countries
22.  
 
While it has continued to play an active role in the international processes around the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
23 and the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Australian government has actively sought to work with other countries – in particular, the 
United States – to develop alternative international approaches to the target-based approach of 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Perhaps the most significant activity in this regard has been the 
leadership role played by Australia in establishing, along with the United States, China, Japan, 
India and the Republic of Korea, the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate in 2005.  The aim of the partnership is to develop global agreements on climate 
change based on clean technology development and deployment rather than the emissions 
target approach used in the Kyoto Protocol
24.  In addition, Australia works with six bilateral 
climate change partners - China, the United States, New Zealand, Japan, the European Union, 
South Africa - on practical cooperative projects responding to global climate change.  More 
than 50 projects in areas such as renewable energy, coal mine methane capture, energy 
efficiency, and carbon sequestration are now under way through these partnerships
25.  
Australia also participates in four multilateral partnerships that focus on technology: the 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, the Methane to Markets Partnership, 
the International Partnership on the Hydrogen Economy and the Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum. 
 




Australia has adopted a range of policy measures at the Commonwealth, State and Territory, 
and local government levels directed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  At the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
20 For an extremely critical assessment of the influence of corporate lobbying on Australian climate change 
policy, see Hamilton, C. (2006), ‘The Dirty Politics of Climate Change’.  Speech to the Climate Change and 
Business Conference, Adelaide, 20 February 2006. 
21 Australia is required to cap its greenhouse gas emissions at 108 per cent of its 1990 emissions, to be achieved 
on an annual basis over the five years from 2008 to 2012. 
22 See, for example, AGO (2006c) (Note 13). 
23 Australia also provides assistance to developing countries in support of the UNFCCC.  For example, since 
1996-1997, Australia has contributed over $279 million to bilateral and regional development assistance for 
activities that contribute to sustainable development while reducing net greenhouse gas emissions, or that help 
developing countries adapt to climate change, with a particular focus on forestry, land management and 
renewable energy.  In addition, the Australian Government has provided funding for capacity development in 
developing countries, for helping vulnerable Pacific small island developing states to monitor and adapt to 
climate change, and for research and development in areas such as climate prediction. 
24 Howard, J., Downer, A., MacFarlane, I. and Campbell, I. (2005), ‘Press Release: Australia Joins New Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. 28 July 2005’ (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, Canberra).  For information on the activities of the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate, see http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org 
25 AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 125-126.   6
Commonwealth level, the emphasis has been on ‘no regrets measures’, where a no regrets 
measure is defined as ‘a measure that has other net benefits (or, at least, no net costs) besides 
limiting greenhouse gas emissions or conserving or enhancing greenhouse gas sinks’
26.  That 
is, the emphasis of policy has been on encouraging Australian industry to contribute to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions while not threatening Australia’s international 
competitiveness
27.   
 
Despite the focus on no regrets measures, the Commonwealth government has committed 
around two billion dollars (Australian) to climate change issues since 1997
28.  The 
Commonwealth government’s Climate Change Strategy
29 incorporates a mix of policy 
measures including consumer and corporate education, voluntary corporate participation in 
emission reduction activities, seed funding for renewable energy innovations, mandatory 
standards for power generation, energy-use efficiency and vehicle fuel efficiency, the 
mandatory uptake of new renewable energy in power supply, research and policy 
development into sinks and emissions, and fostering growth in plantation forestry and native 
vegetation.  These measures are projected to deliver greenhouse emissions abatement of 87 
MT CO2(eq) by 2010
30.   
 
Some of the key policy measures that have been adopted include
31:  
 
•  The Greenhouse Gas Abatement Programme
32 which is designed to leverage private sector 
investment into activities or technologies that will result in substantial reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions or sink enhancement, particularly in the Kyoto target period 
(2008-2012).  
  The Greenhouse Challenge Plus (discussed further below) 
  The A$500 million Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Fund which will operate 
from 2005–2020 to support the demonstration of new low-emission technologies with 
significant long-term greenhouse abatement potential, and to support industry-led projects 
to demonstrate the commercial viability of new technologies or processes, or the 
application of overseas technologies or processes to Australian circumstances. The fund 
aims to leverage at least A$1 billion in contributions from the corporate sector.  
  The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target which will secure 9,500 Gigawatt-hours of 
additional renewable energy electricity by 2010.  In addition, the Commonwealth 
                                                           
26 AGO (1998a), The National Greenhouse Strategy (AGO, Canberra).  The concept of no regrets (i.e. those 
measures that are financially worthwhile in the absence of any concerns regarding global warming) has been 
criticised because it is seen as having the effect of effectively excluding climate change as a factor in decision-
making processes (Hamilton, C. (1996), ‘Thinking About the Future: Equity and Sustainability’, in Department of 
the Environment, Sport and Territories (1996), Equity and the Environment (Department of the Environment, Sport 
and Territories, Canberra, Australia), pp. 16-21). 
27 Howard, J. (1997), ‘Safeguarding the Future: Australia’s Response to Climate Change.  Statement by The 
Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon. John Howard MP, 20 November 1997’. 
28 AGO (2006c) (Note 13). 
29 The Strategy – which consolidates previous climate change initiatives - is articulated through measures 
contained in the 2004–05 Federal Budget (see Department of the Environment and Heritage (2004), Budget 
2004-2005 (Department of the Environment and Heritage, Canberra) and the 2004 Energy White Paper 
(Commonwealth of Australia (2004), Securing Australia’s Energy Future (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra)). 
30 AGO (2006c) (Note 13) at 1.  For a breakdown of the expected emissions abatement from the different 
programmes and policy measures, see AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 60-66. 
31 For a more detailed description see AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 3-6, 36-66.  See also the Australian Greenhouse 
Office website: http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/ 
32 http://www.greenhouse.gav.au/ggap/index.html   7
Government has various programmes to support the commercialisation and use of 
renewable energy technologies. 
  The Solar Cities programme which will provide $75 million over nine years (2004-2013) 
to demonstrate the costs and benefits of solar power, energy efficiency and smart metering 
technologies.  
  The Greenhouse Action in Regional Australia programme which aims to build the 
capacity of the agriculture and land management sectors to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by promoting forest sink enhancement and the integration of forest sinks and 
greenhouse issues with natural resource management.  
 
One of the most significant influences on Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions has been the 
introduction of a wholesale electricity market across Australia, which has increased the carbon 
intensity of electricity generation (through favouring low cost brown coal power producers)
33.  
The Commonwealth government has acted to address (at least partially) this market failure by 
requiring electricity suppliers and large purchasers to increase the quantity of renewable 
energy purchased by 2 per cent by 2010
34, as well as providing funding for the 
commercialisation of renewable energy technologies.  In addition, market liberalisation has 
led to reductions in energy prices in real terms for most consumers in most regions.  The 
relatively low price of electricity in Australia has been a barrier to effective demand side 
management; in Australia, the rate of improvement in end use energy efficiency in Australia 
over the past decade has been about half the OECD average
35.   
 
While most current policy measures are directed at allowing Australia to meet its Kyoto 
Protocol commitments, a number of the measures (e.g. the Low Emissions Technology 
Demonstration Fund, the Solar Cities trial, a $100 million Renewable Energy Development 
Initiative) seek to deliver greenhouse gas abatement options beyond the Kyoto compliance 
period.  Notwithstanding these measures, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions are expected 
to be 127% of the 1990 level by 2020. 
 
States and Territories  
 
In parallel to the Commonwealth government’s activities, each State and Territory has 
established a greenhouse strategy to address those issues with a bearing on climate change – 
for example, waste management, the planning and development of power plants, land use and 
transport planning and vegetation management – that fall under its jurisdiction
36.  It is 
                                                           
33 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000), The Heat is On: Australia’s Greenhouse Future.   
Report of the Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts Committee 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra); AGO (2004a), National Greenhouse Gas Inventory: Analysis of Recent 
Trends and Greenhouse Indicators 1990 to 2002 (AGO, Canberra). 
34 The measure will be implemented through the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 and the Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000, supported by the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2000.  
35 Commonwealth of Australia (2004) (Note 29) at Section 3; Allen Consulting Group (2003), Sustainable 
Energy Jobs Report. Prepared for the Sustainable Energy Development Authority (Allen Consulting Group, 
Sydney). 
36 See, for example, State of Victoria, Department of Sustainability and Environment (2005), ‘Victorian 
Greenhouse Strategy Action Plan Update’ (State of Victoria, Melbourne); New South Wales Greenhouse Office 
(2005), NSW Greenhouse Plan (NSW Greenhouse Office, Sydney); Government of Western Australia (2004), 
Greenhouse Strategy (Government of Western Australia, Perth).  To illustrate the strategies that have been 
adopted, the Victorian government has set out four overarching climate change objectives, namely promoting 
actions that deliver reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions, positioning Victoria to prosper in a low carbon 
economy, developing understanding of the adaptive responses required to deal with the impacts of climate 
change and increasing community awareness about the actions needed to reduce emissions.  For industry and   8
interesting to note that a number of the States and Territories have explicitly acknowledged 
the need for significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions in order to avert the most serious 
effects of climate change.  For example, Victoria has suggested that it will need to reduce its 
emissions by 75% of current levels, with substantial progress towards this goal required in the 
first half of the 21
st century
37.  Similarly, New South Wales has set a target of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2050
38.  In contrast, the Commonwealth government has 




There has been ongoing discussion around the potential for Australia to introduce emissions 
trading as a part of the policy mix directed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  For 
example, in 1999, the AGO issued a series of discussion papers on emissions trading and how 
such a scheme could be implemented in Australia
39.  However, because of concerns about the 
potential cost to Australian business, the Commonwealth government announced in August 
2000 that it would not establish an emissions trading scheme until an international greenhouse 
gas emissions trading scheme had been established. 
 
Despite the Commonwealth government’s position
40, the States and Territories have 
supported the principle of emissions trading
41 and, in January 2004, the First Ministers of 
State and Territory Governments established a working group of senior officials 
(subsequently named the National Emissions Trading Taskforce) to develop a model for a 
national emissions trading scheme
42 .  The group issued a public discussion paper in August 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
commerce, the measures adopted include: requiring licensed facilities to implement best practice with respect to 
energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions and to conduct energy audits and implement actions that have a 
financial payback of up to three years; supporting the development and application of sustainable energy 
technologies and practices in manufacturing; supporting the uptake of greenhouse gas abatement technologies; 
supporting cleaner energy technologies such as improving the combustion efficiency of lignite and the 
development of geo-sequestration; improving public reporting of greenhouse gas emissions for large emitters; 
improving energy management in large commercial buildings (State of Victoria, Department of Sustainability 
and Environment (2005)).  One of the key elements of the New South Wales responses is its Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Scheme (GGAS), which requires electricity retailers and large electricity users choosing to 
participate in the Scheme to meet mandatory annual targets for greenhouse emissions, or pay a financial penalty.  
The Scheme requires electricity retailers to achieve 5% reduction in per capita emissions by 2007 compared to 
1990 emission levels, and then maintain those levels until 2012 (see, further, 
http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au; Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) (2006), 
Compliance and Operation of the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme During 2005 (IPART, Sydney)).   
37 State of Victoria, Department of Sustainability and Environment (2005) (Note 36) at 6-7. 
38 New South Wales Greenhouse Office (2005) (Note 36) at 2. 
39 AGO (1999a), National Emissions Trading: Establishing the Boundaries, Discussion Paper No. 1 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia); AGO (1999b), National Emissions Trading: Issuing the 
Permits, Discussion Paper No. 2 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia); AGO (1999c), National 
Emissions Trading: Crediting the Carbon, Discussion Paper No. 3 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
Australia); AGO (1999d), National Emissions Trading: Designing the Market, Discussion Paper No. 4 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia). 
40 See, for example, Commonwealth of Australia (2004) (Note 34); AGO (2005a) (Note 2) at 41. 
41 See, for example, State of Victoria, Department of Infrastructure and Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (2004), The Greenhouse Challenge for Energy (State of Victoria, Melbourne) at 2 which states: 
“Market mechanisms, such as emissions trading, offer an efficient and effective means of providing incentives 
for emissions abatement.  Victoria supports the development and implementation of a national emissions trading 
scheme led by the federal government, in close consultation with all States and Territories… A Victorian-only 
emissions trading scheme is not proposed as this would be an inefficient route to greenhouse gas abatement and 
would disadvantage Victoria’s economy in the absence of equivalent action by other States and Territories.” 
42 See further http://www.emissionstrading.net.au/home   9
2006 on the possible design of such a scheme
43.  Overall, the scheme would seek to introduce 
a price for carbon into the electricity market but to minimise any adverse effects on trade-
exposed industries through the allocation of free permits to compensate for higher energy 
costs. 
 
In December 2006, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced the establishment 
of a joint government/business Task Group on Emissions Trading.  The Task Group is 
required to advise on the nature and design of a workable global emissions trading system in 
which Australia would be able to participate, while ensuring that Australia’s competitive 
advantages of large reserves of fossil fuels and uranium are preserved
44.  The Task Group, 
which is required to report its findings by 31 May 2007, released an Issues Paper canvassing 
views and input with submissions due by 7 March 2007
45 
 
Despite the growing interest in emissions trading, it is likely that concrete proposals will only 
emerge following the federal election (expected between October and December 2007) and 
once the new government’s climate change policy is defined.  The opposition Labour Party 
has stated that, if elected, it would ratify the Kyoto Protocol, commit to reducing Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2050, establish a national emissions trading scheme and 
increase the mandatory renewables target.  However, the Labour Party has not spelled out the 
specific emissions targets and timeframes it would adopt nor has it explained how the interests 
of emissions intensive industry would be taken into account. 
 
CASE-STUDY: THE GREENHOUSE CHALLENGE AND GREENHOUSE 
CHALLENGE PLUS 
 
The Commonwealth government established the Greenhouse Challenge in 1995 as a 
voluntary programme for public and private sector organisations to undertake and report on 
their actions to abate greenhouse gas emissions.  The aim was to achieve the maximum 
practicable greenhouse gas emissions abatement, while not compromising business objectives 
such as development and growth
46.   
 
Organisations wishing to participate in the Greenhouse Challenge were required to work 
through a six-step process, namely establishing and maintaining an inventory of greenhouse 
gas emissions, developing an action plan to minimise greenhouse gas emissions or enhance 
greenhouse sinks, forecasting expected reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, signing a 
Cooperative Agreement with the Commonwealth government
47, monitoring and reporting on 
                                                           
43 National Emissions Trading Taskforce (2006), ‘Possible Design for a National Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme. August 2006’ (National Emissions Trading Taskforce).  The key features of the draft scheme 
are that: the scheme will be a cap-and trade scheme (in a similar manner to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme); 
the scheme will initially cover all electricity generators of greater than 30MW, extending to all stationary energy 
with emissions of greater than 25,000 tonnes of CO2-equivalent after five years; offset credits would be accepted 
from landfill and sewage methane use and forestry, with the potential for linking the scheme to international 
schemes through the use of the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms; trade-exposed energy intensive sectors 
would be compensated through the free allocation of permits; no free permits to new entrants into the market. 
44 Task Group on Emissions Trading (2007), ‘Issues Paper’ (Task Group on Emissions Trading, Canberra).  The 
group’s structure is tailored to reflect this objective, with the membership, in addition to a number of government 
representatives, comprising representatives from Xstrata Coal, International Power, Australian Pipeline Trust, 
Qantas, BHP Billiton, Alumina and National Australia Bank. 
45 Task Group on Emissions Trading (2007) (Note 44). 
46 Howard (1997) (Note 27). 
47 Cooperative Agreements were expected to include an emissions inventory, an assessment of the opportunities 
available for abating greenhouse gas emissions, a greenhouse action plan, and a commitment to regular   10
greenhouse gas emissions against targets, and being open to independent verification.  The 
Greenhouse Challenge did not involve specific abatement targets being imposed on 
participating organisations, nor were there any sanctions or penalties where forecasts were not 
achieved.   
 
In May 2004, the Australian government announced budget funding of A$31.6 million for the 
Greenhouse Plus – Enhanced Industry Partnerships measure (hereafter the Greenhouse 
Challenge Plus).  The Greenhouse Challenge Plus builds on the infrastructure and existing 
commitments of the Greenhouse Challenge
48, with the Cooperative Agreements signed under 
the Greenhouse Challenge being carried forward into Greenhouse Challenge Plus
49.  
Participants’ commitments are broadly similar to those under the Greenhouse Challenge; 
participants are required to measure and monitor their greenhouse gas emissions, deliver the 
maximum practicable greenhouse gas abatement, continuously improve the management of 
greenhouse gas emissions and sinks, work towards the milestones set in individual 
agreements, provide annual reports to the Australian Greenhouse Office, make a public 
statement about participation in the programme, promote industry participants’ activities and 
participate in independent verification of annual progress reports
50.  The annual progress 
reports are expected to include an updated emissions inventory, a statement of absolute 
changes in emissions, a statement of progress against significant abatement actions, changes 
in emissions intensity, details of the calculation methodologies and assumptions used, an 
indication of which elements of the report are not confidential and a sign off by the chief 
executive or authorised delegate
51. 
 
From 1 July 2006, participation in Greenhouse Challenge Plus is a mandatory requirement for 
Australian companies receiving fuel excise credits of more than A$3 million and for the 
proponents of large energy projects
52.  The AGO has estimated that these new requirements 
will affect around 100-200 businesses
53, although many were previously participants in the 
Greenhouse Challenge.   
 
The programme allows participants to be recognised as Greenhouse Challenge Plus Leaders if 
they publicly disclose their gross emission levels, their short-term goals for greenhouse, an 
overview of their climate change strategy and the expected direction of future greenhouse gas 
emissions and mitigating actions
54.  In addition, they are expected to develop action plans to 
meet or exceed their annual greenhouse goals, to reference best practice in the development of 
greenhouse targets and key performance indicators, and to encourage their suppliers to take 
greenhouse actions
55.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
monitoring and reporting of performance.  Cooperative Agreements can be viewed at 
http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/cgi-bin/challenge/dbsearch.p1 
48 Greenhouse Challenge Plus will also provide the framework for Greenhouse Friendly certification (a voluntary 
initiative that provides Australian businesses with the opportunity to market ‘greenhouse-neutral’ products or 
services) and the Generator Efficiency Standards programme (which aims to aim to achieve best practice in the 
efficiency of electricity generation). 
49 AGO (2005b), ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: Programme Framework 2005’ (AGO, Canberra, 2005). 
50 AGO (2005b) (Note 49). 
51 AGO (2005b) (Note 49).  
52 AGO (2005c), ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: An Australian Government-Industry Partnership to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Improve Energy Efficiency’ (AGO, Canberra). 
53 AGO (2005c) (Note 52).   
54 AGO (2005b) (Note 49). 
55 AGO (2005b) (Note 49).   11
The actions taken under the Greenhouse Challenge Plus programme are expected to contribute 
more than 15 MT CO2(eq) in greenhouse gas emissions reductions in 2010
56. 
 
Outcomes from the Greenhouse Challenge 
 
The Greenhouse Challenge has formed the centrepiece of the Australian government’s efforts 
to encourage business to take action on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change for over 
ten years.  Over 750 organisations were members as at the end of 2006
57 and the programme 
had significant coverage of Australian greenhouse gas emissions with almost total coverage in 
a number of major industrial sectors, including electricity generation and distribution, oil and 
gas extraction, iron and steel and aluminium, and coal mining.   
 
The flexibility provisions in the Greenhouse Challenge were supported by industry as 
enabling cost-effective approaches to greenhouse gas emissions abatement to be 
implemented
58, and the programme has provided a range of important soft effects, in 
particular making greenhouse and climate issues a part of management decision-making 
processes
59.   
 
Despite these positive outcomes, the overall contribution of the Greenhouse Challenge to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from Australian business appears to have been relatively 
modest.  The Greenhouse Challenge did not provide strong incentives for participating 
organisations to set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets beyond business as usual, and 
the existence of the Greenhouse Challenge was used by industry to deflect calls for the 
introduction of stronger policy measures such as emissions trading.  It appears that the major 
contributions of the Greenhouse Challenge were to encourage some organisations to bring 
forward some energy saving or greenhouse gas emission reduction projects and to help 
participating organisations to identify opportunities that provided clear short-term financial 
benefits
60.  While many of the participants stabilised their greenhouse gas emissions over the 
period 1995 to 2000
61, emissions from Australian business as whole have continued to rise, 
                                                           
56 AGO (2005d), ‘Australia’s Response to Climate Change’ (AGO, Canberra). 
57 For a current list of members, see: 
  http:www.greenhouse.gov.au/challenge/members/pubs/list_of_challengers.pdf.  It was envisaged that 500 
companies would have signed Cooperative Agreements by the end of 2000 and that 1000 companies would have 
signed by the end of 2005.  The AGO subsequently stated that the mandatory requirements to join the 
Greenhouse Challenge Plus meant that the government’s 2005 target was no longer a useful indicator of progress 
(AGO (2004b), AGO Annual Report 2003/2004 (AGO, Canberra) at 27).   
58 See, for example, Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN) (2005), ‘Submission on Greenhouse Plus: 
Industry Consultation Discussion Paper’ (AIGN, Melbourne). 
59 Sullivan, R. (2005), Rethinking Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK) at 120-122. 
60 Sullivan, R. and Sullivan, J. (2005), ‘Environmental Management Systems and their Influence on Corporate 
Responses to Climate Change’, in Begg, K., van der Woerd, F. and Levy, D. (eds.) (2005), The Business of 
Climate Change: Corporate Responses to Kyoto (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield), pp. 117-130 at 122.  From the 
data that are available, there is limited evidence that the organisations participating in the Greenhouse Challenge 
went beyond a narrowly defined interpretation of the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction 
measures.  The majority of the projects implemented were either low capital cost projects or projects that 
provided very short payback periods.  In this context, the Greenhouse Challenge can be said to have been 
economically efficient in that it did not require firms to implement measures beyond those that could be clearly 
justified in economic terms.  A more critical conclusion could be that the Greenhouse Challenge did not provide 
the strong drivers necessary to encourage companies to take advantage of all the opportunities that might be 
available (Sullivan (2005) (Note 59) at 115-117).   
61 For a more detailed discussion of the emissions performance of Greenhouse Challenge participants, see 
Sullivan (2005) (Note 59) at 110-115.    12
with emissions from the electricity sector some 35% higher in 2004 than in 1990 and 
emissions from industrial processes 18% higher
62.   
 
While Australian business has strongly supported the Greenhouse Challenge, environmental 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) argued that the Greenhouse Challenge was simply a 
public relations campaign for activities that would have happened anyway
63.  In addition, 
NGOs expressed concern about the close relationship between government and industry in the 
Greenhouse Challenge, in particular the emphasis on the confidentiality of industry data and 
the absence of a formal role for NGOs in the Joint Consultation Committee (JCC) which 
oversaw the operation of the Greenhouse Challenge.   
 
As a final comment on the Greenhouse Challenge, it is difficult to evaluate the precise 
contribution that the programme has made to achieving greenhouse gas emissions reductions.   
In a 2004 review, the National Audit Office noted that the emissions reductions claimed for 
the Greenhouse Challenge did not take account of what would have happened in the absence 
of the Greenhouse Challenge, the effect of corporate environmental management systems, or 
the effect of State and Territory climate change-related policy initiatives and programmes
64.  
The review also highlighted significant inconsistencies in the emissions reductions that the 
government had predicted for participating organisations and the actual reductions achieved
65.  
Furthermore, given that participating organisations were free to define their own baselines and 
business as usual performance, there was clearly the potential for participating firms to 
overstate their expected emissions growth thereby allowing them to claim that they have 
achieved even greater reductions in emissions
66.   
 
Expected Outcomes from Greenhouse Challenge Plus 
 
The Greenhouse Challenge Plus appears to address some of the weaknesses of the Greenhouse 
Challenge
67.  First, the Greenhouse Challenge Plus is not a purely voluntary programme but 
offers clear financial incentives for certain companies to participate although, given that many 
of these companies are already likely to be participants, this may not result in a significant 
increase in membership of the programme.  Secondly, the Greenhouse Challenge Plus now 
differentiates between participating companies.   The incentives associated with Greenhouse 
Leaders should, prima facie, encourage companies to go beyond – and stay beyond – 
minimum compliance with the requirements of the programme.  It remains to be seen how 
many companies will actually decide to become Greenhouse Leaders, as companies may be 
concerned that a failure to continue to meet the requirements of Greenhouse Leaders will lead 
                                                           
62 It has been argued that many of the ‘easy’ emissions reduction measures (the ‘low hanging fruit’) have now 
been implemented and it will become ever more difficult to achieve reductions without incurring economic 
penalties (Allen Consulting Group (2000), Meeting the Kyoto Target: Impact on Regional Australia.  Report by 
the Allen Consulting Group for the Minerals Council of Australia (Allen Consulting Group, Melbourne)). 
63 Sullivan (2005) (Note 59) at 123-125. 
64 National Audit Office (2004), The Administration of Major Programs: Australian Greenhouse Office 
(National Audit Office, Canberra) at 43, 70. 
65 National Audit Office (2004) (Note 64) at 82. 
66 See also Sullivan, R. and Ormerod, R. (2002), ‘The Australian Greenhouse Challenge: Lessons Learned and 
Future Directions for Climate Policy’, in Albrecht, J. (ed.) (2002), Instruments for Climate Policy (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham), pp. 170-191 at 184-187 
67 For a more detailed assessment of the potential contribution of Greenhouse Challenge Plus, see Sullivan, R. 
(2006), ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: A New Departure or More of the Same?’, Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 60-73.   13
to criticism or negative press coverage
68.  Thirdly, the improved disclosure requirements (in 
terms of the information that companies are required to put into the public domain) should 
address at least some of the NGO concerns about the lack of transparency.  However, it is 
pertinent to note that the Greenhouse Challenge Plus retains its strong emphasis on the 
protection of commercial information
69 and it is therefore likely that NGOs will continue to be 
critical of the programme in this regard.   
 
However, many of the weaknesses of the Greenhouse Challenge remain unaddressed.  Most 
importantly, the Greenhouse Challenge Plus does not impose specific performance targets on 
participating companies or provide strong incentives for companies to significantly reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions beyond business as usual
70.  A further issue is that the 
oversight structure (the Industry-Government Partnership Committee) that has been 
established for the Greenhouse Challenge Plus continues to exclude key stakeholders
71.  It is 
therefore likely that environmental NGOs will continue to criticise the programme.  Finally, 
the Greenhouse Challenge Plus may be less acceptable to Australian industry, which has 
expressed concern at the move away from the strictly voluntary approach that characterised 
the Greenhouse Challenge
72.   
 
TOWARDS CARBON NEUTRAL GROWTH 
 
The major policy options for significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions require 
significant investments (capital and operating costs, political support, cooperation) over the 
medium to long term.  Ultimately, the ability of voluntary programmes such as the 
Greenhouse Challenge Plus to contribute to achieving significant emissions reductions is 
dependent on the surrounding mix of policy instruments.  It is clear that in order to achieve 
significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, Australia will need to strengthen both its 
greenhouse gas emissions targets and the policy instruments it uses to deliver these targets.  
There is also a need to provide greater policy certainty beyond the Kyoto Protocol compliance 
period of 2008-2012, as policy uncertainty is a key barrier to investments in areas such as 
clean energy
73.  There is growing evidence that early action and the strengthening of the 
climate change policy framework – for example, seeking a 60% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050 over year 2000 levels – will provide economic benefits to Australia, 
through the early positioning of the economy for more stringent future carbon price signals, 
                                                           
68 See, for example, the comments of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network which has argued that the 
priority for the Australian government should be to raise the profile of the voluntary approach to greenhouse, 
rather than singling out leaders for specific praise (AIGN (2005) (Note 58)). 
69 AGO (2005b) (Note 49) at 4. 
70 As a consequence, Sullivan (2006: 71) suggests: “The consequence is that organisations are likely to continue 
to make economically sub-optimal decisions on investments in energy efficiency or greenhouse gas abatement.  
This, in turn, means that the incentives for innovation will continue to be weak.” (Sullivan (2006) (Note 67)).  
71 AGO (2005e), “Industry-Government Greenhouse Partnership Committee” (AGO, Canberra, 2005). 
72 See, for example, AIGN (2005) (Note 58). 
73 For example, the Victorian government has stated: “A clear and stable energy and greenhouse policy 
framework is required to give the energy industry it needs to make the long-term investments necessary to meet 
our growing energy needs. If the current uncertainty continues, it will complicate and possibly deter investment 
in intermediate and baseload generation.  It is also likely to dampen private investment in developing, 
demonstrating and commercialising new low-emission energy technology, and in the uptake of renewable energy 
and energy efficiency improvements” (State of Victoria, Department of Infrastructure and Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (2004) (Note 41) at 8).  For a more general discussion of how policy uncertainty 
affects investment decision-making, see Sullivan, R. & Blyth, W. (2006), ‘Climate Change Policy Uncertainty and 
the Electricity Industry: Implications and Unintended Consequences.  Chatham House Briefing Paper EEDP BP 
06/02’ (Chatham House, London, UK).   14
lowering the costs of transition to a carbon constrained future and lowering the risk of 
disruptions (or shocks) to the economy
74.  
 
In order to deliver on these benefits, it is suggested that the Australian government prioritises 
the establishment of a ‘long, loud and legal’
75 climate change policy framework at the 
international and domestic levels.  This framework should include appropriate long-term 
targets for emissions reductions as well as appropriate monitoring and implementation 
processes.  In this regard, there are three priorities. 
 
The first is for the Commonwealth government to support the establishment of an 
international target-based regime, where the targets are consistent with stabilising atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that will avoid the worst effects of climate change.  
The scientific evidence suggests that this ‘safe’ level is of the order of 450-500 ppmv, 
corresponding to an approximately 60% reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions by 
2050 over 1990 levels.  Allowing for growth in developing countries, this would equate to 
emissions reductions of the order of 60-90% in industrialised countries by 2050.  Australia’s 
present international activities – for example, in the areas of technology transfer – will make 
important contributions to the delivery of these goals. 
 
The second is for the Commonwealth government to set clear and unambiguous long-term 
climate change targets for Australia.  Reflecting the types of targets that will probably be 
required of industrialised countries, these should be of the order of 60-80% reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, from a 1990 baseline, together with intermediate targets 
that allow Australia to achieve this goal in an economically efficient manner.  It is suggested 
that the Australian government set a binding target for 2020 of the order of a 20-25% 
reduction over 1990 emission levels, to provide investment certainty for business over the 
medium term. 
 
The third is to establish a carbon pricing mechanism through the establishment of a national 
emissions trading scheme, that is aligned with these national targets and that links to 
international emissions trading activities.  On its own, however, emissions trading is unlikely 
to stimulate significant investments in lower emitting forms of power generation and, 
therefore, the Australian government needs to continue and probably accelerate its efforts in 
areas such as energy efficiency, renewable energy and clean (or low emissions) energy.  The 
long-term credibility of emissions trading – and other measures directed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions – requires that competitiveness issues are explicitly considered as a 
key part of the design and implementation of an emissions trading regime
76.  Competitiveness 
issues may be addressed through considering intensity-based allocations at the national level 
(i.e. so that the net impacts are minimised but that lower greenhouse gas emitters are 
                                                           
74 Preston, B. & Jones, R. (2006), Climate Change Impacts on Australia and the Benefits of Early Action to 
Reduce Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CSIRO, Melbourne); Allen Consulting Group (2006), Deep Cuts in 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions; Economic, Social and Environmental Impacts for Australia (Allen Consulting 
Group, Melbourne);  State of Victoria, Department of Infrastructure and Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (2004) (Note 73) at 18.  Similar arguments about the international benefits of early action have also 
been advanced by the International Energy Agency (International Energy Agency (2006), World Energy Outlook 
2006 (International Energy Agency, Paris)). 
75 This term is used in Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change (2006), ‘The Business Case for Early 
Action’ (Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change) at 7. 
76 For example, the Victorian government has proposed that a national emissions trading scheme should be 
“…complemented by measures to address the potential vulnerability of energy-intensive trade-exposed 
industries…” (State of Victoria, Department of Infrastructure and Department of Sustainability and Environment 
(2004) (Note 41) at 17.  See also Sullivan & Blyth (2006) (Note 73) for a more general discussion of this issue.    15
rewarded) and through maximising the linkages with international trading schemes.  In this 
context, it is important to highlight the fundamental tensions that lie at the heart of the 
proposals that have been made by the National Emissions Trading Taskforce and the terms of 
reference of the recently appointed Task Group on Emissions Trading.  In order to achieve 
long-term emissions reductions across the Australian economy as a whole, it is almost 
inevitable that trade-exposed sectors such as aluminium will have to significantly reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions.  While it is ultimately a matter for government to decide how these 
reductions are to be paid for, the proposals that have been advanced thus far do not appear 
sufficiently focused on the goal of achieving significant reductions from energy-intensive 
sectors.  That is, the Australian government needs to signal that it accepts that action on 
climate change may cost money and may disadvantage certain sectors of the economy, at least 
over the short and medium-term.  Without that recognition and acceptance, companies will 
not take government commitments seriously, and will assume that economic and 





The structure of the Australian economy – in particular the dependence on the mining and 
minerals industry and on access to low cost energy – has been the key influence on Australia’s 
approach to international climate change negotiations and to domestic policy.   
 
While Australia expects to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments, this is primarily due to the 
significant emissions reductions from the land use, land use change and forestry sector.   
Otherwise, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions have grown significantly ahead of its Kyoto 
Protocol targets.  Furthermore, beyond 2012, Australia expects its greenhouse gas emissions 
to grow significantly (by approximately 27% over 1990 levels through to 2020). 
 
The public policy measures adopted to date are consistent with Australia’s desire not to 
disadvantage its businesses.  The major policy approaches have been voluntary measures such 
as the Greenhouse Challenge programme and significant financial support or subsidies for 
renewable and cleaner energy.  The Australian government has not implemented the stronger 
policy measures, for example, emissions trading, necessary to direct the Australian economy 
towards significant reductions in its greenhouse gas emissions.  Even if the proposals that 
have been advanced by the National Emissions Trading Taskforce were implemented, they 
fall a long way short of providing the strong incentives necessary to achieve significant 
emissions reductions. 
 
The lack of policy certainty, the lack of clear targets beyond 2012 and the absence of a ‘price’ 
for carbon represent key barriers to the investments – for example, in clean coal – necessary to 
significantly reduce Australia’s greenhouse emissions.  In order to remove these barriers, the 
Commonwealth government needs to signal its commitment to achieving significant 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over the next 30 to 50 years, and commence the 
implementation of the policy measures – in particular emissions trading and prioritising 
energy efficiency both in the electricity generation sector and across the economy as a whole 
– to deliver on this commitment.   
 